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Abstract 
 
This study contributes to research on immigrant economic incorporation by considering the 
relative wages of immigrants and their adult children to the US-born population.  By comparing 
racially-disaggregated wage distributions for New York, Los Angeles, and the US overall, this 
study provides perspective on the complicated social and economic contexts within which 
intergenerational immigrant progress occurs.  This research is of interest because consideration 
of the US-born children of immigrants invokes questions of social mobility and the persistence 
of inequality more broadly.  Further, this paper contributes to a theoretical debate over place and 
immigrant progress by examining the 1.5 generation, for whom residence in concentrated 
immigrant cities has been theorized as detrimental to economic incorporation.  Finally, this 
paper introduces substantial analysis of local wage structures. Results suggest that 
intergenerational prospects are geographically specific and contingent on the continuing contexts 
of racial wage inequality - for even the US-born of US parents.   
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Introduction 
  Research on immigrant economic progress has increasingly focused on prospects for the 
second generation.  In part, this is a result of the entry into adulthood of many of the children of 
post-1965 immigrants, and the concomitant visibility of large numbers of 2
nd generation/1.5 
adult individuals
1 in US census data and other sources.  More than a cohort data effect, however, 
this emphasis also results from the realization that immigrant incorporation is a multi-
                                                 
1 Although Current Population Survey data provide information on parental birthplace necessary to 
identify the second generation, limited sample sizes prohibit metropolitan-level consideration of wage 
data of race-disaggregated foreign-stock groups.  The identification of the 1.5 generation in the 1990 and 
2000 5% PUMS data affords a suitable proxy, with a substantially larger sample.   I differentiate the 1.5-
generation population from the remainder of the foreign-born population by age at arrival:  following 
Perlmann and Waldinger (1997) I define the 1.5 group as immigrants who entered the US before they 
were twelve years of age.  It is plausible that this group has had many of the benefits of a US education 
and exposure to English by the time they enter the labor market as adults.  The foreign-born as 
distinguished in this remainder of this paper are thus those immigrants who arrived later in life. The term 
“foreign-stock”, ordinarily used to refer to immigrants and the second generation, is used in this paper to 
refer to both immigrant and 1.5 generation groups. 
   2
generational process (Niedert and Farley 1985, Farley and Alba 2002, Perlmann 2005).  
Theoretically, the US-born and educated children of immigrants should largely escape the 
immigrant penalties their parents face in the US labor market.  Yet those very disadvantages may 
have consequences that persist into the 2
nd generation.  Among the many factors thought to 
determine how the children of immigrants fare, significant attention is paid to where the children 
of immigrants live and work.  This emphasis derives in part from an empirical understanding of 
the difficulties workers (and especially immigrant workers) face in highly unequal immigrant 
cities like Los Angeles and New York.  At the same time, predictions that second generation 
economic progress will be constrained by their location in ethnically-concentrated immigrant 
cities (or dependent on their relocation away from sites of first-generation settlement) owe much 
to spatial assimilation theorists’ conflation of social and spatial mobility via internal migration.  I 
suggest that this results in a geographically uncontextualized analysis, in that 1) it theorises places 
with regard to immigrant incorporation as little more than concentrations of immigrants and 2) 
it ignores how urban labor market contexts might differ across generations and across racial 
groups. This paper seeks to introduce relational understandings of how immigrants and the 
children of immigrants fare relative to the US-born in the US overall and in the immigrant cities 
of New York and Los Angeles.  In so doing, it introduces consideration of the local labor 
market structures of wage inequality to questions of immigrant intergenerational progress, 
especially with regard to the racial/ethnic structure of wages in comparative city contexts.     
Much of the focus on the importance of location for the second generation arises from 
spatial assimilation theory’s suggestion that immigrant assimilation is reliant upon dispersal from 
concentrated sites of immigrant settlement.  This is especially true over time, and especially for 
the second generation, for whom continuing ethnic concentration is often seen as an obstacle to   3
economic opportunity.  Geographers and others have broadened this spatial focus away from 
concentration and dispersion to questions of how and why immigrants' prospects for economic 
incorporation are geographically contingent, both within and across US metropolitan areas (see, 
for example, the contributors to Waldinger 2001).  More detailed considerations have examined 
how immigrants fit into occupational sectors of local economies, their resulting occupational 
comparisons with natives, and how this process has changed over time (Ellis, Wright, and 
Goodwin-White 2005).  This work is consistent with what has been termed a "configurations of 
inequality" approach, whereby researchers seek to understand how and why dimensions of 
inequality among various groups vary across labor markets (McCall 2001).  Comparisons of 
immigrants with the US-born are particularly fruitful in this regard as they engage dimensions of 
both race and class in questions of inequality.  The relatively recent ability to consider the adult 
children of immigrants provides an opportunity to examine these relationships not only with 
regard to immigrants but also to their US-born and educated children, further invoking 
questions of social mobility and the persistence of ethnicity as a component of overall inequality.   
  Thus far, there has been surprisingly little academic attention to how second generation 
wages compare with the US-born (at least third generation) or with their immigrant parents’ 
generation, let alone geographic variation in wage gaps.
2  Much of the focus has remained 
instead on educational attainment and concluded that the second generation is by and large more 
educated than their parents’ generation (Zhou 2001, Farley and Alba 2003).  At the same time, 
this literature raises concern that immigrants’ concentrated settlement in immigrant cities with 
highly unequal labor market conditions may threaten their childrens’ progress in catching up 
with the US-born of US parents (Gans 1992, Clark 2001, Zhou 2001).  Whether proceeding 
                                                 
2 Although there is considerable emphasis on comparing ethnic wage gaps (with US-born whites) of the current 
second generation with the children of earlier European immigrants.  This literature is too extensive to go into here, 
but see Borjas (1999) and Perlmann (2005).   4
from a theoretically spatial assimilation perspective that equates individual progress with spatial 
mobility, or the more macro-level concern with conditions in global cities, it is apparent that 
geographic context needs more investigation with regard to its implications for immigrant 
fortunes.  In this paper, I suggest that the key to understanding how immigrants and their 
children fare involves a more nuanced and relational understanding of the structures of local 
labor markets.  Educational gains among the children of immigrants may translate differently in 
different labor markets, depending on the demographic “aging out” of natives, economic 
restructuring, and discrimination, as well as the social configurations of inequality that reward 
education and skills with different labor market positions depending on racial or ethnic status.  
Although this is far from a thorough foray into considering the importance of multiply-scaled 
immigrant geographies, it is certainly a critical step in theorising the relational contexts within 
which we assess immigrant incoporation. 
  I employ a relative distributions approach to the examination of wages (from 1990 and 
2000 U.S census data) for natives, immigrants, and their adult children in the immigrant cities of 
Los Angeles and New York, as well as for the US overall.   Relative distributions methods 
provide for more detailed analysis of structures of inequality and employment than traditional 
parametric approaches by examining the overall distribution of wages rather than comparing 
mean wages of different groups (Handcock and Morris 1999).  They thus provide a means for 
comparing different groups' relative positions within the wage structure across and within cities, 
and how these positions have changed over time.  I also decompose relative wage changes for 
educational covariates such that compositional differences between various immigrant, second 
generation, and US-born race groups can be isolated from residual inequality between groups in 
different cities.  This approach allows for consideration of how opportunities for immigrant   5
incorporation have been affected by these city contexts of wage inequality, as well as the 
relational changes in labor market position realized by native, immigrant, and second generation 
groups between 1990 and 2000.  
  These preliminary analyses indicate that, just as for their parents, cities of residence 
matter in determining the economic prospects of the second generation.  This is not just because 
some cities have higher wages than others, but also because there are different opportunities and 
penalties accruing to relative position in local labor markets – and perhaps especially in 
immigrant metropolises.  The relative position of the children of immigrants is also contingent 
on social context, however, such that intergenerational mobility between immigrants and their 
children does not translate into the same mobility relative to the US-born in different city or 
national contexts.  This is in part due to the fact that immigrants enter urban labor markets that 
are already highly racialized in ways that structure opportunities for the US-born (Bound and 
Freeman 1992, Jencks 2001, Hirsch and MacPherson 2004) and immigrants alike.  Relatedly, it is 
also because of the differing penalties to immigration in differently-structured labor markets, and 
different opportunities for and limits to intergenerational social mobility.  Relative distributions 
analysis of immigrants, their children, and the US-born by race provides perspective on the 
relative positioning of groups in local labor markets and the US as a whole.  Coupled with 
analysis of economic changes over time and decomposition of educational differentials, this 
approach allows consideration of the ways in which context is important in determining how the 
children of immigrants will fare in the US, and begins to complicate the spatial and theoretical 
contexts within which we assess immigrant incorporation. 
 
Theoretical Background   6
Intergenerational Immigrant Incorporation 
Research on the children of immigrants has largely been concerned with their 
educational attainment, as a predictor of labor market outcomes.  In part, this is because the 2
nd 
generation are still quite young as a cohort.  Although sizeable numbers of the second generation 
were only beginning to enter adulthood by 2000, however, the extended histories of immigration 
to Los Angeles and New York are such that there are substantial numbers of the second 
generation in these cities.  While some of these are the children (both child and young adult) of 
post-1965 immigrants, Mexico’s contiguous border and continuous flow of immigrants to the 
US means that there are significant numbers of non-white second generation adults in Los 
Angeles (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002, Perlmann 2005).   
Concerns with 2
nd generation economic progress invariably invoke intergenerational 
incorporation issues, and these are mostly economic in nature.  A recent literature stresses that 
significant intergenerational educational gains for all ethnic groups leave little doubt the second 
generation will close the wage gap their immigrant parents had with the US-born.  (This is 
especially true for some 2nd generation Asian groups, whose parents already had higher levels of 
education than the US-born).  There is a very high rate of college attendance for the second 
generation overall, although the Latino second generation does not yet have the very high levels 
of college completion typical of some Asian groups (Zhou 2001, Farley and Alba 2003).
 3   In 
fact, the oft-cited reason for increasingly severe immigrant wage penalties (that immigrants’ skill 
levels improved but those of the US-born increased much more rapidly and significantly) 
4 is 
                                                 
3 Clark(2001) Grogger and Trejo (2002) and Trejo(2004) are among those who are concerned that the 
low levels of education and high levels of poverty of some (especially Mexican)immigrant parents will 
translate into educational disadvantages for their children. 
4 This argument was initially articulated by Chiswick (1978), in his debate over immigrant wages and skill 
with Borjas.  See Ellis (2001) for coverage of this argument.   7
likely to be challenged by the very high level of educational mobility between the current 
immigrant and second generations – a level much higher than that for the US-born of US-born 
parents, whose educational trajectories peaked rather earlier in times of newly high college 
attendance (Card 2004).   
  While educational gains made by the children of immigrants are indeed impressive, many 
researchers are concerned that the low socioeconomic background of some immigrants will 
continue to seriously hamper their children’s economic progress (Clark 2001, Fry 2002, Trejo 
2004, Kochar 2005).  The spatial focus on immigrant cities and the continued residence of the 
second generation in these locations informs these prognoses.  And although there is certainly 
an empirical dimension to these anxieties (large US metropolises are, after all, nightmares for 
many parents competing for scarce educational resources), the somewhat decontextualized 
reading of places as little more than immigrant concentrations is at play here.  More theoretically, 
the same assimilation theories applied to immigrant economic incorporation are also applied to 
their US-born and educated offspring – in ways that neglect to consider spatial concentrations 
processurally and intergenerationally.  While segmented assimilation perspectives explicitly 
address generational differences in orientation to the host society, spatial assimilation 
perspectives are more difficult to theorize intergenerationally, in part because they describe a 
particularly immigrant journey.  However, both approaches have been threaded through 
prognoses for the second generation, and they invoke specifically geographic understandings of 
intergenerational immigrant progress.  This is not to argue that parental position is not critical 
for the children of immigrants – just that the unique geographies of immigrant employment and 
disadvantage should not be expected to affect their US-born children in the same way.    8
Segmented assimilation theorists emphasize the increasingly harsh labor market 
conditions that have characterized the last thirty years in which many of the second generation 
have come of age, suggesting that the low-skilled but adequately compensated jobs that provided 
upward mobility for immigrants prior to economic restructuring are no longer available.  
Further, segmented assimilation scholars suggest, the children of immigrants are even less likely 
than their parents would have been to have accepted substandard employment as a means of 
social mobility, as they have the expectations of US citizens, rather than the immigrant 
willingness to take on unrewarding work.  Thus, they argue, the interaction of immigrant 
generation and changing economic conditions is unlikely to yield second generation progress, 
and may result in downward mobility for many in the second generation (Kao and Tienda 1996, 
Perlmann and Waldinger 1997).  Compounding this relatively dire forecast is segmented 
assimilation’s important contribution that race and ethnicity continue as important determinants 
of labor market outcomes even among the 3
rd generation+ US-born, such that the erasure of 
group distinctiveness suggested by classical linear assimilation stories is quite limited.  
Complementary to this, scholars argue, the current second generation will not benefit, in terms 
of economic and social position, from the closing off of large influxes of immigrants that 
benefited earlier immigrant arrivals and their children by limiting competition for employment 
and host society discrimination (Borjas 1999, Waldinger and Lee 2001).   
Spatial assimilation theorists have pursued significantly different understandings of what 
affects intergenerational immigrant progress, if with similar expectations.  While spatial 
assimilation ideas suggest that geographic dispersion is consonant with (if not either evidence of 
or requisite for) economic and social assimilation, it seems far more of a stretch to apply this 
model to the second generation.  Although the development of spatial assimilation perspectives,   9
most notably by Massey (1986) and Alba and Logan and their colleagues
5 originally applied to 
the intra-urban central city to suburb dispersion associated with the economic progress of new 
immigrants, they are increasingly deployed at grander scales. 
6  Ideas that immigrant cities 
provide initial sites of concentrated ethnic resources for new immigrants, but that long-term 
residence in immigrant cities hinders both economic and social mobility have dominated the 
literature on immigrant incorporation, as well as public discourse.  Yet the very negative 
conditions that mark continued residence in an immigrant city (namely segregation in poorly 
renumerated, low-status immigrant jobs) are unlikely by definition to be experienced by their 
US-born children.
7   Zhou, for example, presents evidence that California residence is often 
advantageous for the second generation because of the concentration of colleges and 
universities, and because of opportunities for the second generation to avoid the “only minimally 
adequate employment” their immigrant parents experience (2001).    The research presented in 
this paper and related research on internal migration and destination choice (Ellis and Goodwin-
White in press, Goodwin-White 2006a) provides further evidence of this critique of the 
extension of city-level spatial assimilation arguments to the second generation.  Before 
proceeding, however, it is necessary to note briefly the connections of spatial and segmented 
assimilation perspectives to a broader concern with the geographic dimensions of immigrant and 
second generation incorporation.  
 
Geographic perspectives on immigrants and the second generation 
                                                 
5 See, for example: Alba and Nee (1997), Alba et al 1999, Logan et al (2002). 
6 See Ellis and Goodwin-White (2006) for a review. 
7 In fact, part of the reason for such jobs is that these immigrant cities are gateways for newcomers to the 
US – and the second generation are not newcomers.   
   10
  It is perhaps not surprising, given the theoretical antecedents just discussed, that 
immigration researchers have increasingly turned to ideas that geographic context matters a good 
deal for how immigrants fare, at a variety of scales.  Although context is often expressed in 
comparative international perspective, considering how immigration policy, refugee law, and the 
role of the state in social welfare provision have shaped different national experiences of 
immigrant and second generation incorporation,
8 and also in more classically spatial assimilation-
informed investigations of neighborhood residential choice (Alba et al 1999, Estrada and Mare 
2004), the vast majority of such studies compare metro-level contexts of immigrant 
incorporation.
9  Clark, for example, notes that immigrants currently reside in cities with very 
high and increasing levels of immigrant poverty, especially Phoenix and Houston.  Further, while 
in most cities immigrants’ wages fall between those of US-born blacks and US-born whites, this 
is not the case in major immigrant cities of the southwestern US
10, where immigrants make lower 
wages than all US-born groups.  Clark suggests, as do other scholars concerned with immigrant 
progress in highly unequal cities, that such conditions will likely prove detrimental to second 
generation economic incorporation, even with increasing levels of education (2001, see also 
Waldinger 2001, Trejo et al 2002).   
In line with Clark’s analysis of high-poverty immigrant cities, Ellis considers how labor 
market conditions in immigrant cities improved for natives and declined for immigrants in the 
1980s, although the pattern of change varied by city (2001).  In single locations, Myers and 
Cranford (1998) examine the changing economic contexts of occupational segmenting for 
Latinas across cohort and generation in California, and Ellis, Wright and Goodwin-White 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Zolberg (1999), and Reitz (1998) on national contexts of immigrant incorporation, 
and vanTuebergen et al (2004) on the second generation specifically. 
9 Most notably the contributors to Waldinger (2001). 
10 These include Los Angeles, Dallas, Denver, Phoenix, and Houston in Clark’s analysis.   11
(forthcoming) similarly consider the occupational distributions of immigrant and native workers 
in Los Angeles following the economic changes of the 1990s.  A recent attempt to link 
geographic context to spatial assimilation critiques finds metro and state-level immigrant 
concentrations have continuing importance for 1.5 generation internal migration and destination 
choice, with little evidence of negative economic effects (Ellis and Goodwin-White in press, 
Goodwin-White 2006). The more specifically geographical (rather than sociological) nature of 
this research turns on investigation of where immigrants and natives have what kinds of jobs 
and how those jobs are rewarded, rather than on cities as concentrations of immigrants.  As 
such, they attempt to consider prospects for immigrant incorporation under disparate and 
changing wage and employment structures. Following on the heels of this research, the 
remainder of this paper attempts more relational understandings of relative position by 
comparative wage analyses in two immigrant cities and in the US overall, as well as the ways in 
which these relationships have changed in the 1990s.  This introduction of new methods for 
analyzing inequality to understandings of why place matters for immigrant incorporation falls far 
short of a comprehensive analysis of the social, cultural, and economic forces that yield different 
outcomes for different groups in different places. As a foray into understanding contextual 
inequality, however, it is a first step in analyzing and re-theorizing the different geographies of 
immigrants and the second/1.5 generation, and what they bode for social mobility.  
 
Research Questions 
As a consequence of the discussion over the second generation, above, several specific 
research questions are posed.  How are immigrants and their adult children are faring 
economically relative to the US-born?.  Are the economic trajectories of immigrants and their   12
parents better in some places than in others?  While we often presume that different places 
present different opportunities for both US-born individuals and immigrants, we are less sure 
how this is so, and how it is relationally, as well as absolutely, so.  This is to say, that while 2
nd 
generation Hispanics may make higher wages in New York City than in Los Angeles, they may 
fare worse relative to other groups in New York City.  It is not only that costs of living differ 
between cities, although they do and this fact is certainly important.  It is moreover that relative 
position marks a range of disadvantages that structure labor markets and the opportunities they 
offer different individuals.  Relative position may be as important as absolute position in terms 
of understanding the intergenerational immigrant incorporation.
11  This leads to the third and 
fourth research questions posed in this paper.  How is second generation economic mobility 
related to the relative position of their parents and US-born co-ethnics in various US contexts?  
Finally, to what extent does residual inequality persist between children of immigrants and 
children of US natives after controlling for educational attainment differences between 
populations?    
In order to answer these questions, I present the results from three different relative 
wage analyses, as described above.  These analyses focus on the immigrant cities of Los Angeles 
and New York as well as the entire US.  As the two largest immigrant cities in the US, and ones 
with diverse immigrant populations, these cities have the advantages of large samples of multiple 
1.5 generation race groups.  Further, they have been of considerable theoretical interest in 
forecasting the economic futures of the children of immigrants.  Geography matters first and 
foremost, of course, because immigrants and natives live in very different labor markets, ones 
                                                 
11 In related research, I find that relative wages at origin and destination are a more significant 
determinant of immigrant and 1.5 generation destination choice in internal migration than are absolute 
wage differentials (Goodwin-White 2006).   13
that tend to be highly unequal.  Comparing these immigrant cities with the US at large also 
allows a focused investigation of wage gaps as they vary geographically. 
 
Data and Methods 
Researchers focusing on immigrant economic progress spend considerable effort on 
analysis of gaps in the mean wages of immigrants and natives.  This is problematic in that 
immigrant wage distributions are much more polarized than those of the US-born population.  
To take an illustrative example, comparison of mean wages of US-born whites and immigrant 
Asians would show that immigrant Asians have equaled native white wages, while 1.5 generation 
Asians have surpassed them
12.  This is in large part due to the top skew on foreign-stock Asian 
wages pulling up the mean.  Analysis of overall wage distributions for both groups shows that 
there is still extensive overrepresentation of immigrant Asians at the lowest end of the labor 
market, relative to US-born whites.  Further, much of the immigrant-native wage gap is thought 
to be a product of the extraordinarily low wages recent immigrants earn.  As this should not be a 
characteristic of the second generation, more detailed analysis of wages at the lowest end of the 
wage distribution allows a glimpse of whether significant racial wage differences persist into the 
second generation.  In fact, the relative distributions approach of this paper provides a useful 
visualization tool for considerations of intergenerational immigrant economic incorporation 
under unequal labor market structures, as will become evident in the following section.   
Thus, from the 1990 and 2000 5% PUMS, I extract samples of 25-54 year-old men who 
are not self-employed or in group quarters and have wage and hours data.  I limited analysis to 
men because of the very different employment situations of immigrant and native women 
                                                 
12 From calculation of mean wages from the 1995-2000 pooled Current Population Survey.   14
(Hagan 1998, Myers and Cranford 1998, Ellis 2001, Wright and Ellis 2000), and the 
incomparability of men’s and women’s wages (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994, Pessar 1999, Smith 
2002).  An intergenerational assimilation perspective is harder to apply to women, as immigrant 
women generally make less than immigrant men, but US-born non-white women often fare 
better in the labor market than their white counterparts.   And finally, I chose to omit women 
because of the already complicated visuals.  Much immigrant labor, especially in immigrant cities, 
is so highly gender-segregated that wage distributions are relatively incomparable as men and 
women are not in competition for the same jobs (Hagan 1998, Myers and Cranford 1998).  The 
men selected for this analysis are in prime working years rather than nearing retirement, and not 
self-employed as such employment is unregulated by (and perhaps not in competition with) 
more generalized labor market structures.    
For comparison purposes, foreign-born and 1.5 generation Hispanics and Asians are 
compared with US-born (second generation or more) whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians.  
These groupings capture the major nativity/race groupings in the US.  All other groups are 
omitted from comparison.  Again, this is largely because of the complexity of such analysis, and 
the increased difficulty of interpretation with multiple groups.  For this reason, foreign-stock 
whites were eliminated from the analysis as their wage profiles scarcely differ from native-born 
whites.  (The reality, of course, is that foreign-born whites are also not really theorized in the 
current literature on immigrants’ economic incorporation.)  Multiple race categories from the 
2000 census are made compatible with 1990 single race responses by use of a crosswalk scheme 
that compresses small numbers of multiple-race respondents into single race categories.
13  Where 
                                                 
13 In this scheme, those respondents who claimed white/black or white/Asian were included as blacks 
and Asians, respectively.  All respondents claiming Hispanic ethnicity were included as Hispanics.  The 
few other multiple race combinations were excluded from the analysis.   15
1990 and 2000 wages are directly compared, 2000 wages are adjusted by a Consumer Price Index 
deflator of .792 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000) for population-weighted samples of 1000 
persons from each group in each of 1990 and 2000.
14  The decompositions of wages by 
educational composition reported in the next section are the result of a 4-category education 
covariate measured by education completion of 1) less than high school, 2) a high school 
diploma or GED, 3) some college, or 4) a bachelor’s degree.  For these eight groups, the entire 
wage distribution is compared, with US-born whites serving as the reference distribution.  All 
wages are logged and represented proportionally to US-born white wages.    
The decision of a comparison group is obviously critical in such analysis.  Although 
researchers concerned with immigrant assimilation might choose US-born Latinos as the 
assimilatory reference for immigrant and 1.5 generation Latinos, for example, this would be 
challenging to analyze in that 1.5 generation Latinos or Asians often have higher wages than 
their US-born counterparts.  This has led, increasingly, to diagnoses of economic “over-
assimilation”, as if to imply that the children of immigrants are doing too well (Leslie, Lindley, 
and Thomas 2001). 
15  From a perspective taking account of the racial inequality that persists 
among the US-born of US-born parents and grandparents, it makes sense to compare other 
groups’ wage relative to those of US-born whites (generally speaking, the highest wages overall).  
This choice also allows for an understanding of immigrant and second generation assimilation to 
                                                 
14 Metro-specific deflators are not necessary in a relative distributions approach where entire metro wage 
distributions are compared. 
15  This would obviously be the case were 1.5 generation Caribbean blacks to be compared with US-born 
blacks, pointing out the complications of race and ethnicity in the US.  Although similar discussions of 
economic “overassimilation” have become increasingly common, the term was originally used to refer to 
cultural over-identification with the host society, with a loss of cultural ties to country of origin 
   16
a national or local context in which race still matters a great deal for one’s economic position – 
without a normative acceptance of this.   
The choice to compare New York and Los Angeles with the US as a whole was made 
for several reasons.  First and foremost, Los Angeles and New York are by far the largest and 
most diversely-constituted immigrant cities, and have long histories as such.  The emphasis in 
much of the immigrant incorporation literature, as well as the new second generation literature, 
is on the highly unequal labor markets these cities provide for immigrants.  This includes the 
suggestion of some scholars that prospects for second generation economic mobility are 
contingent upon mobility out of these highly unequal immigrant cities.  (Although, as I suggest 
throughout this paper, the disadvantages immigrants face in these places should not necessarily 
be expected to translate to their US-educated children, who may not escape ethnic penalties, but 
should escape those associated with immigrant/US-born differences.)  This is because much of 
the immigrant/US-born wage gap is attributable to the quite different residential and work 
geographies of recent immigrants and the US-born (Card 2004, Goodwin-White 2006b).  Finally, 
these cities have captured the attention of immigration researchers to the extent that we have a 
good deal of information on the social and economic mechanisms of immigrant inequality in 
these cities.  We know from Waldinger’s analysis, for example, that immigrants faced much less 
discriminatory institutional environments in New York City than in Los Angeles throughout 
most of the past century, largely as a result of unionization that benefited immigrants and natives 
alike (1996).  Although a tale of two immigrant cities is largely incomplete as a spatially-
contextualized analysis (as the contributors to a five-city analysis, see Waldinger 2001, 
demonstrate), it does allow the fine-grained examination of labor market structure attempted   17
here – and hence for a detailed introduction of labor market inequality to condition questions of 
intergenerational immigrant incorporation.   
In presenting the results of this analysis, I first examine relative wages in 1990 and 2000 
in the US, in order to get a picture of the structure of the overall US labor market with regard to 
immigrant intergenerational progress and racialized wage gaps.  I follow this with analysis of Los 
Angeles and New York in order to compare specific immigrant city contexts of wages between 
the cities and with reference to the US as a whole.  Whatever significant wage differences exist 
between New York and Los Angeles, especially with regard to immigrant/1.5 generation/US-
born gaps, can also be expected to exist between other cities much more different than these 
two immigrant cities are from each other.  As such, this comparative analysis presents initial 
evidence that further attention is needed to the ways in which city contexts of inequality affect 
immigrant incorporation, across places far removed from immigrant cities. 
   
Results 
I.  Intergenerational Immigrant Inequality in the United States, 2000 
  Figure 1 displays logged hourly wages for US-born blacks and foreign-born, 1.5 
generation, and US-born Asians and Hispanics relative to wages of US-born whites.
16  US-born 
white wages are represented as the dashed line at 1 on the y-axis.  All other groups’ wage profile 
lines are proportional to this distribution, such that the intersection point of each group with this 
dashed straight line marks the point in the distribution of US-born white wages where there are 
equal proportions of the comparison group at that point in the wage distribution. (If any group 
                                                 
16 For clarification, these are raw logged hourly wages (not modeled).  The lines represent a smoothed distribution 
of points with a kernal smoother of .03, as customary in relative wage analysis.  Although smoothing means that 
some data are lost, this approach is far less parametric than that involved in mean wage analysis, and preserves far 
more of the overall wage distribution (Handcock and Morris 2001).   18
had a wage profile equivalent to US-born whites, their wage distribution would also be 
represented by the dashed line at 1.)   In other words, from Figure 1 (panel 1) we can tell that 
there are proportionally as many 1.5 generation Hispanics making the same wages as US-born 
whites at the 38
th percentile of the US-born white distribution.  This is the point, so to speak, 
where the two wage distributions “balance out”, such that 1.5 Hispanics are overrepresented 
below the 38
th percentile of the white wage distribution, and underrepresented (relatively) above 
this point.  In real values, this is approximately $12.50/hr, represented by the real log values on 
the top x-axis.  Most notably (as indicated by the relative density measured on the y-axis) there 
are about twice as many 1.5 generation Hispanics at the lowest end of the wage distribution as 
there are US-born whites, and about two-thirds as many at the top end.  Predictably, immigrant 
Hispanics are much worse off relative to the US-born than are 1.5 generation Hispanics: there 
are nearly twice as many of them at the bottom of the wage distribution as their children’s 
generation, or about four times as many of them as US-born whites (and consequently, only 
about half as many immigrant Hispanics as US-born whites are at the uppermost end of the 
wage distribution).   
  As a point of reference, we can see that US-born blacks are also very disadvantaged 
relative to US-born whites.  Curiously, for the US as a whole, US-born blacks and 1.5 generation 
Hispanics look quite similar in terms of relative wage position.  US-born Hispanics also look 
similar, although they are more extremely overrepresented among the lowest wage earners, 
probably as a result of their lower educational levels when compared with 1.5 generation 
Hispanics.  Wage distributions for Asians look much more similar to those of US-born whites, 
although all Asian groups show some skewing at the upper end of the wage distribution.  This is 
especially true of foreign-born Asians, who show modest overrepresentation at the lowest wages.    19
Comparing relative wage distributions of these eight major immigrant, 1.5 generation, and US-
born race groups clearly provides a picture of labor market structure, including racial and ethnic 
segmenting across generations.  This also allows relational analysis of economic assimilation, in 
that questions of whether the 1.5 generation closes their parents’ generation’s gap with various 
US-born groups can be assessed both in terms of decreasing distance from the reference wage 
distribution and in terms of the comparative shapes of each group’s distribution.   
More interestingly still, the interactions of generational status and race in this regard 
complicate ideas of immigrant generational progress toward economic parity with US-born 
whites, and perhaps provide evidence of patterns of economic incorporation more in line with 
suggestions of segmented assimilation theorists.  While intergenerational social mobility is 
evident for 1.5 generation Hispanics (in terms of lower inequality with US-born whites 
compared to immigrant Hispanics), this progress does not continue for US-born Hispanics.
17  
Although there is no doubt that 1.5 generation Hispanics are making significant progress in 
closing the wage gap their parents’ generation had with US-born whites, there still exists marked 
inequality between white and Hispanic wage distributions, whether immigrant or US-born.  This 
raises questions of how we conceptualize economic assimilation.  Here, I suggest that economic 
assimilation of the 1.5 generation can most usefully be assessed by comparing the diminishing 
gap with US-born whites’ wages between the foreign-born and 1.5 generation.  Although the gap 
should diminish considerably, in line with ideas of intergenerational progress, the still-clear 
differences between US-born race groups here emphasizes the racially-structured labor markets 
immigrants and their children are expected to assimilate to. 
                                                 
17 This provides dramatic visual evidence of what researchers comparing annual mean wages have are 
beginning to document: an improvement in second generation Hispanic wages that is not sustained into 
the current third+ native-born generation (Trejo 2002, 2004, Pew 2005).     20
Examining the entire structure of Asians’ wages yields insights regarding economic 
assimilation ideas as well: 1.5 generation and US-born Asian wage distributions look much more 
like those of US-born whites.  This is not only because of the downward skewing of foreign-
born Asians’ wages compared with US-born whites, but also because of their positive wage 
skew.  The shape of wages for foreign-born Asians is much more polarized than wages for US-
born whites, although there is predictably more overrepresentation at the bottom of the wage 
distribution.  This is easily explained by the bifurcating of immigrant skills encouraged by US 
immigration policy that admits both unskilled family migrants and highly-skilled professionals.  
The differently-shaped wage distribution, however, renders interpretations of economic 
assimilation in terms of “catching up with US-born whites” problematic.  The importance of 
examining relative wages across the entire distribution of wages becomes apparent here, as 
analysis of mean wages obscures the fact that much of the reason Asian immigrants’ wages look 
similar to US-born whites is that large distributions of immigrants at the top end of the wage 
distribution pull their mean much closer to the US-born white mean wage.  In part, of course, as 
will be seen in the following section, this is due to the very different geographies of immigrants 
and the US-born – such that Asian immigrants’ wages are higher in large part because they are 
more likely to reside in relatively high-wage cities. 
 
A Tale of Two Cities: Immigrant Inequality in New York and Los Angeles 
Figure 1 compares the overall 2000 wage distribution (panel 1) just seen with those of 
Los Angeles (panel 2) and New York (panel 3).  The first thing to note is that the scale of the y-
axis for these specific city comparisons increases, in line with the high levels of inequality 
documented in these immigrant cities.  This is also evidenced by the greater spread in wages   21
represented by the real log values reported on the x-axis.   New York and Los Angeles show no 
polarization of Asian wages.
18  The top skewing of wages here is isolated from what these high 
wages would “pull up” in an analysis of mean wages.  This means that Asian immigrants’ 
earnings are not actually at parity with US-born whites at the mean, as some reports suggest, but 
in fact that part of the “increased inequality” in immigrant cities is in fact due to extraordinary 
“within-group” inequality in these cities versus the US as a whole.  This doesn’t explain away 
between-group inequality, obviously, as the overrepresentation of most foreign-stock groups (5-
7 times that of native whites at the lowest point!) among extremely low wage earners is quite 
apparent.  
Comparisons of these two immigrant cities and the US demonstrate the reasons for 
considering local wage structure in intergenerational incorporation.  There is less distance 
between US-born race groups in Los Angeles than in New York or the US.  While both foreign-
born and 1.5 generation Hispanics and Asians are more unequal (relative to native whites) in Los 
Angeles than in the US as a whole, this disadvantage is relatively abated by the US-born 
generation.  In summary, then, Los Angeles is marked by higher than average inequality for 
immigrants and their children, but much lower inequality for US-born Hispanics (and Blacks) 
than the US as a whole.   
There is, then, a significant wage penalty to immigrants in Los Angeles, one that extends 
to 1.5 generation Hispanics.  However, there are opportunities for US-born Hispanics to do 
much better (relatively) in Los Angeles when compared with the rest of the US.  From an 
immigrant assimilation perspective, the fact that 1.5 generation Hispanics have wage 
                                                 
18 In fact, much of this polarization in the US overall has to do with their overrepresentation in Los 
Angeles and New York, where wages at the top of the wage distribution are higher than in the rest of the 
US.  The advantage of distributional analysis here is that it demonstrates the importance of understanding 
the geography of immigrants in the US.   22
distributions more like U.S-born Hispanics is complicated by the fact that US-born Hispanics 
are still strongly segmented from other US-born groups (Blacks excepted) in the overall US labor 
market.  In Los Angeles, in comparison, greater immigrant and 1.5 generation segmenting is 
accompanied by diminished inequality for US-born non-white groups.  Although considerable 
segmenting continues for these groups, it is quite less than that in the US overall.  Although Los 
Angeles continues to look quite bleak for immigrants, there is some reason for optimism in that 
there is less racial inequality for the US-born (some the descendants of immigrants) in this very 
unequal immigrant city than in the US as a whole.  Again, much of the extraordinary wage 
penalty faced by immigrants in Los Angeles is due to the presence of large numbers of 
newcomers in a bifurcated high-wage labor market.  
In New York, however, all non-white groups, whether native- or foreign-born, show 
higher levels of inequality with whites than in Los Angeles.    All Asian groups are far worse off 
in New York than in the US overall - especially immigrants.  This is even true of US-born Asians 
(at parity with US-born whites in Los Angeles).  Hispanic immigrants are also much worse off in 
New York than in Los Angeles or the rest of the US, with nearly seven times as many immigrant 
Hispanics at the bottom of the wage distribution.  And US-born Hispanics are almost as unequal 
in New York as in the US at large, which is to say that they are significantly more segmented 
from other US-born groups than in Los Angeles.  In the US overall and in New York, then, US-
born Hispanics are almost as unequal as 1.5 Hispanics.  In Los Angeles, inter-generational 
assimilation between immigrant, 1.5, and US-born Hispanics occurs largely because US-born 
Hispanics have almost closed the wage gap with US-born whites - unlike in New York or the US 
as a whole.   
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II.  Changes in Group Inequality, 1990-2000 
These conditions have also changed markedly over the last decade, such that local 
economic conditions change the contexts into which immigrant/1.5 generation groups live and 
work.  These shifts are analyzed by considering decadal shifts in wage positions (Figure 2) in 
order to determine who gained and who lost during the 1990s.  There is dramatically increasing 
inequality for Hispanics in the US overall.  However, this not so much the case for foreign-born 
Hispanics, despite popular concern with immigrants’ contribution to increasing inequality.  It is 
especially true, though, of 1.5 generation and US-born Hispanics, who were much more likely to 
be at the very lowest end of relative wage distributions in 2000 than 1990.  Further, while 
economic assimilation arguments might suggest that Hispanic 1.5ers are doing better in both 
1990 and 2000 than their immigrant parents’ generation, the size of this advantage has declined 
significantly over the decade. As a result, intergenerational mobility, especially with regard to 
closing the gap between Hispanics and whites, has declined.  In summary, changes in the US in 
the 1990s were such that Hispanics fared relatively worse over the decade – although foreign-
born Hispanics escaped some of the downturn that 1.5 and US-born Hispanics experienced.   
 
Changes in Two Immigrant Cities: 1990-2000  
Figure 2 also juxtaposes decadal changes in city labor market structure. Los Angeles, 
shows a considerable decrease in relational inequality for immigrant Hispanics, and a smaller but 
still significant decrease for 1.5 generation Hispanics.  In New York, however, the disadvantage 
of immigrant Hispanics increases dramatically, while foreign-stock Asians begin to do relatively 
better (although they are still more unequal than in Los Angeles by 2000). The very clear point 
overall, to reiterate, is that this analysis shows that “catching up” to the US-born population,   24
depending on the reference group, may in fact be remaining really unequal, given the racial 
hierarchies that interact with immigration in the US.  In these figures, as throughout this paper, 
we see evidence of Los Angeles’ “immigration penalty” and New York’s “race penalty”.   
The most notable finding here is that by 2000, all non-whites fare much worse relatively in New 
York than in Los Angeles. 
19   This is especially true for immigrant Hispanics and Asians.  It is 
possible that this has much to do with New York’s long-term economic decline, whereas the fact 
that Los Angeles’ booming economy didn’t slow down until the 1990s, gave non-white groups 
an opportunity to gain a foothold in the labor market (Wright and Ellis 2001).  This means that 
suggestions that New York provided a better context for immigrant economic incorporation 
that Los Angeles (Waldinger 1996) may not hold up when relative wages are considered vis-à-vis 
US-born whites across an entire distribution of wages, and when an intergenerational perspective 
on economic progress is taken.  While Waldinger (1996) suggested that the institutional history 
of New York helped to provide better opportunities for immigrants (largely in terms of union 
jobs), such mechanisms were increasingly present in Los Angeles in the 1990s.  The living wage 
movement in Los Angeles emerged from the immigrant-led Justice for Janitors campaign, and 
continues to be driven by coalitions that include immigrant organizers (Valle and Torres 2000).  
Immigrant workers are disproportionately affected by the living wage ordinance as employees of 
agricultural and landscaping firms with City of Los Angeles contracts or service workers in 
tourist zone hotels covered by the measure (LAANE 2005).  During this same period unions 
organized immigrant workers in unprecedented numbers (Meyerson 2004), and the minimum 
wage was increased.  This is not to say that Los Angeles becomes an idyllic place for immigrants 
and their descendents in the 1990s, as these figures so clearly show, but rather that in that local 
                                                 
19 With the exception of the 1.5 generation, who do relatively the same in both cities.   25
context matters, there were tremendous social and economic shifts in the 1990s.  As summary, 
Table 1 reviews 1990-2000 changes in New York and Los Angeles, as well as in the US overall. 
 
Table 1 - Summary of 1990-2000 Wage Changes 
US 
•  Increased inequality for Hispanics (but mostly US-born and 1.5 generation Hispanics) 
•  Polarizing of Asian wage distributions 
Los Angeles 
•  Considerable decrease in inequality for immigrant Hispanics, also some decrease for 1.5 
generation 
New York 
•  Dramatically increased inequality for immigrant Hispanics 
•  Dramatically decreased inequality for immigrant/1.5 generation Asians 
 
Understanding Decadal Changes: Gainers and Losers in Immigrant Cities in the 1990s 
 
Relative distributions analysis can be extended to ask which groups were overrepresented 
among those who gained or lost position in New York and Los Angeles in the 1990s.  This is 
important since part of the reason immigrants’ position improved relatively in Los Angeles is 
doubtless due to the downturn in wages in that labor market generally.  In Figure 3, relative log 
wage change is represented over the decade.  In Los Angeles, immigrant Hispanics are 
significantly more likely to have gained from economic shifts between 1990 and 2000 than U.S.-
born whites.  This is both relative to U.S.-born whites and also in terms of real wages, as 
indicated by the log wage values on the top horizontal axis.  1.5 generation and U.S.-born 
Hispanics, conversely, were overrepresented among losers in the 1990-2000 Los Angeles 
economy.  Again, this is probably due in large part to an increase in wage setting mechanisms 
that disproportionately affected immigrants, even as the Los Angeles economy faltered and U.S.-
born Hispanics were unable to maintain their labor market positions.  Immigrant Asians in Los   26
Angeles are overrepresented among both strong wage gainers and strong wage losers, consistent 
with the polarization of Asian wages in Los Angeles over this period.  Curiously, though, U.S.-
born Asians display wages that were more likely to remain unchanged than those of U.S.-born 
whites.  This could perhaps be because of compositional differences related to which groups left 
Los Angeles in the 1990s, a possibility that points to the necessity of linking wage analysis to 
internal migration during this period. 
This is in stark contrast to how immigrants fared over the same period in New York.   
U.S.-born Latinos are wage gainers, while immigrants are more likely to have experienced both 
relative and absolute wage losses.  New York and Los Angeles have differently-composed 
Hispanic populations, to be sure,
20 but this is further evidence that context matters not only in 
terms of absolute wages but also in terms of who benefits or loses from changing economic 
circumstances.  Indeed, it seems likely that a strong surge of immigrant organizing and activism 
around the living wage contributed to gains for immigrants at the lowest levels of the wage 
distribution in Los Angeles, especially given that gains for these groups were absolute as well as 
relative (when native-born groups had no such absolute gains).  These gains may not translate as 
well to the slightly-better paid (2nd-decile) Latino jobs.  At any rate, the 1990s made clear that 
Los Angeles’ institutional wage-setting mechanisms were beginning to be established very 
differently from New York’s, in large part due to immigrant activism.   
All Asians  are strongly represented among New York’s gainers.  The more selective 
immigration policy of the 1990s, in which quotas for professionals were increased substantially, 
may be part of the explanation here.  It is important to remember, however, as demonstrated in 
                                                 
20 Although Puerto Ricans are excluded from these analysis, since the fact that they don’t really 
“immigrate” to the U.S. distinguishes the conditions of their entry (as part of what distinguishes 
immigrants’ positions in the labor market) from Mexicans and other Hispanic groups.   27
panel 3 of Figure 1, that all Asians still experience greater inequality relative to U.S.-born whites 
in New York.   It is also important to remember that immigrant Hispanics were able to turn 
economic downturn to their advantage in Los Angeles (relatively speaking), whereas Asians are 
the only group faring better in 2000 than ten years previously in New York (panels 5 and 6 of 
Figure 2).  In fact, the vast majority of wage gains made during this decade in New York were 
made by immigrant Asians. 
 
 
III.  Education-Adjusted Wage Distributions in Los Angeles and New York 
The final question this paper seeks to determine is the extent to which wage inequality 
remains after controlling for differences in educational composition between foreign-born, 1.5 
generation, and US-born individuals.  Again, this is an attempt to take discussions of immigrant 
economic incorporation away from individual “skills packages” that garner labor market rewards 
toward awareness of contextual inequality.  It is obviously rudimentary, in that the only control 
in this case is a 4-category measure of educational attainment.
21  However, given the focus of 
many researchers on the relationship between lower educational levels and wage inequality 
between immigrants and natives, the following analysis provides an initial means of addressing 
this correlation and assessing discrimination by controlling for the educational differences 
thought to affect wages. 
  Figure 4 compares the wages of immigrant/1.5 Hispanics with those of US-born whites 
in Los Angeles and New York in 2000.
22  These are similar to earlier figures, although only two 
                                                 
21 The categories employed are: 1) less than high school, 2) high school diploma, 3) some college, and 4) 
bachelor’s degree. 
22 The remainder of this paper focuses on 1.5 generation and immigrant Hispanics (by far the largest 
foreign-stock group in the US) as their wage gaps with US-born whites are larger than those of foreign-
stock Asians.   28
groups are compared in these cases, and bars representing deciles of the wage distribution are 
superimposed along with the smoothed relative distributions function.  In each case, the first of 
the three plots presents unadjusted comparisons of wages.  The second presents the same wage 
comparison with the comparison group (immigrant or 1.5 generation Hispanics or Asians) 
having the same educational profile as the US-born white reference group.  The third plot then 
reveals the residual inequality not explained by differences in educational composition.  Entropy 
statistics, as a measure of the differences in the two wage distributions, are provided in each 
case.  There are then two comparisons taking place for each city: 1) a comparison of 
immigrant/1.5 generation wages with US-born white wages, and 2) immigrant inter-generational 
comparisons relative to the US-born.  In this way, it becomes possible to compare 
immigrant/1.5 generation/racial/city differences in wages.  
Panel 1 (Figure 4) compares the relative wages of immigrant Hispanics and US-born 
whites.  The unadjusted wage distribution in the first plot is thus identical to that in Figure 1.  In 
the second plot, immigrant Hispanics’ educational levels are adjusted such that they match those 
of US-born whites.  This counterfactual decomposition poses the question of what the relative 
wages of these two groups would look like if Hispanic immigrants had the same educational 
composition as US-born whites. The entropy decreases by about two-thirds from this 
adjustment, from .61 to .39, such that approximately two-thirds of the difference in wage 
distributions between the two groups is explained by differences in educational composition.  
Residual inequality (that unexplained by education) is thus about one-third of total inequality.  
More information is gleaned by comparing the shape changes of these plots.  In this case, most 
of the decline in inequality after adjusting for education is in the first wage decile.  This is not 
surprising, especially for immigrant Hispanics.     29
Here, perhaps, is evidence of what Piore (1979) termed “immigrant jobs”: the especially 
low-skilled low-paid jobs at the lowest end of the labor market that are reserved especially for 
immigrants and completely segregated from the rest of the workforce.  This is the difference that 
can be attributed to the difference in education/skills gaps between immigrants and the US-
born.  If immigrants had educational profiles similar to natives, they would not be so 
overrepresented in this decile.  Perhaps, in fact, many of these jobs would not exist, especially in 
Los Angeles (Card 2004, Ellis, Wright, and Goodwin-White forthcoming).  The shape change 
due to educational composition reduces immigrants’ overrepresentation in the lowest decile, and 
predictably has the effect of increasing their representation in all other deciles – even the next 
lowest one.  The final plot then shows the difference in wage distributions remaining after 
education is equalized.  Immigrants are greatly overrepresented in the lowest two deciles of the 
wage distribution, even after controlling for educational differences.  
Surprisingly, given the fact that the 1.5 generation is largely US-educated, their 
educational differences vis-à-vis the US-born continue to exert the same proportional influence 
(about 1/3) on the differences between their wages and those of native-born whites (panel 2).  
Inequality with US-born whites for the 1.5 generation is about half that of their parents’ 
generation in Los Angeles, but nearly two-thirds of the difference is attributable to educational 
composition and one-third remains after adjusting for these differences.  This suggests that 
racialized wage structures go well beyond just the 1
st generation of immigrants, as evidenced 
further in the nearly identical wage positions of US-born blacks, Hispanics, and 1.5 generation 
Hispanics we considered in Figure 1. 
While about two thirds of foreign-born and 1.5 generation Latino inequality with US-
born whites is attributable to educational differences in Los Angeles, much greater inequality   30
remains unexplained in New York, as shown in Panel 3.  Despite similar initial entropy to Los 
Angeles (.61), entropy only declines to .35 in New York, indicating that nearer to half of the 
difference in overall wages remains unexplained by controlling for education.  This effect is 
exacerbated for 1.5 generation Hispanics in New York, as seen in the final panel, with half their 
wage gap with US-born whites unexplained by educational differences.  The fact that such high 
residual inequality persists for those who arrived in the US as very young children, even when 
controlling for educational differences, speaks to the extraordinary persistence of ethnic wage 
segmenting in New York.  
As with Hispanics in Los Angeles, inequality with US-born whites diminishes between 
immigrants and the 1.5 generation (panel 4).  Again, less of the wage gap is explained by 
educational differences in New York than in Los Angeles, and nearly half remains after 1.5 
Hispanics’ education is adjusted to match that of US-born whites.  While this result falls short of 
establishing greater discrimination in New York than in Los Angeles, it does indicate that there 
are greater hypothetical returns to education (in terms of relative wage position and decreasing 
gaps with US-born whites) for immigrants and their 1.5 generation children in Los Angeles.  
This complements the earlier finding that race matters more for wage differentials in New York 
for US-born non-whites, while disadvantage in Los Angeles is due in large part to immigrant-native 
differences.  1.5 generation Hispanics are less unequal than their parents’ generation with regard 
to US-born whites in both cities.  There is more intergenerational social mobility in New York 
than in Los Angeles, but this is largely due to the fact that their educational profile is nearer that 
of US-born whites in New York.  In summary, although immigrant Hispanics start out with 
similar wage differentials in New York and Los Angeles, significantly more of this disadvantage 
is explained by educational differences in Los Angeles.  This means that greater unexplained   31
inequality persists in New York.  While the 1.5 generation makes significant advances from their 
parents’ generation in terms of parity with US-born whites in both cities, however, they do so to 
a greater extent in New York, largely as their educational profile in that city more nearly matches 
that of US-born whites. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The relative distributions and comparative metropolitan area analyses of this paper 
provide several insights.  First, standard mean-based wage analysis comparing third generation 
US-born whites with immigrant and second generation groups underestimates the persistence of 
inequality (and often overestimates intergenerational immigrant economic incorporation) due to 
the more polarized distributions of immigrant and second generation wages.  This is especially 
true of comparisons of US-born whites with Asian foreign-stock groups, such that immigrant 
and second generation Asians are overrepresented with regard to US-born whites at both the 
highest and the lowest ends of the wage distribution.  This polarization has increased 
dramatically in the last decade, such that mean wage comparisons that find this foreign-stock 
group “catches up to” or surpasses native whites neglect their persistent concentration at the 
bottom of the labor market.  Further, the relative distribution of wages varies substantially 
between US cities, such that relative position may be an important predictor in terms of 
determining immigrant economic incorporation – as well as the internal migration choices that 
are often seen as outcome (rather than context for) incorporation.  In that labor market 
opportunities are structured by the relative positions of racialized wage structures, relative wages   32
may mark job segregation that has long-term consequences for inequality.  The contexts of labor 
market inequality vary geographically in ways that affect immigrant progress. 
23  
  While 1.5 generation Hispanics, for example, fare better in terms of absolute wages in 
New York than in Los Angeles, they are far more likely to be at the lowest end of the overall 
wage distribution in New York than in Los Angeles.  Further, while their wages are higher 
relative to their immigrant parents in New York, and close gaps with US-born Hispanics, this is 
in large part because US-born Hispanics fare so much more poorly relative to US-born whites in 
New York City.  Discussions of intergenerational mobility, then, must be situated in relational 
contextual analyses in which race continues to play a major role in determining labor market 
position even for the US-born.  There is a definite “immigration penalty” (immigrants and their 
children are more highly isolated from the rest of the labor force, but this isolation abates 
significantly for US-born blacks and Hispanics) in Los Angeles.  However, more significant 
immigrant intergenerational mobility for Hispanics and Asians in New York is complicated by 
an intensely persistent “race penalty”, in which all US-born groups remain more isolated from 
US-born whites than in New York. 
  Comparison of different economic trends between cities and the US as a whole over the 
period in question revealed a substantially different potential for the relative wages of 
immigrants and their children.  In Los Angeles, for example, where job growth stagnated during 
the 1990s after booming in the 1980s (Ellis, Wright, and Goodwin-White forthcoming), 
immigrant Hispanics managed to improve their (relative) position between 1990 and 2000.  They 
were also overrepresented relative to all other groups in terms of real wage growth (although still 
earning the lowest wages), doubtless in part because of institutional changes in the wage 
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elsewhere (Goodwin-White 2006a).   33
structure such as the increase in the minimum wage, immigrant unionization and the living wage 
movement.  In New York City, however, immigrant Asians fared relatively better in 2000 than in 
1990 (despite being relatively worse off than immigrant Asians in Los Angeles), but immigrant 
Hispanics fared worse over the decade, as did all non-white US-born groups.   
It is likely that both changes in immigration policy and the internal migration of these 
groups played a role.  Relative wage distributions changed in part as higher-wage workers left 
Los Angeles over the decade.  Additionally, Los Angeles’ substantial job growth in the 1980s 
may have provided immigrant Hispanics with entry points into the labor force that New York’s 
already stagnating labor market did not (Wright and Ellis 2001).  The fact that immigrants made 
relative economic gains in the 1990s in Los Angeles, while US-born Hispanics made this 
decade’s relative gains in New York may indicate the strengths of different wage-setting 
institutional mechanisms in these two cities: largely immigrant in Los Angeles and largely union 
in New York.  At any rate, the different economic circumstances and racial and ethnic 
configurations of inequality of US cities in the last twenty years are critical considerations in 
understanding immigrant incorporation and second generation social and economic mobility.  
  Finally, decomposition of relative wage distributions for educational differences between 
immigrant and 1.5 generation Hispanics and US-born whites yields information on the wage 
returns to education and non-skill-based discrimination in different contexts.  While immigration 
researchers have argued that much of the mean difference between immigrant and US-born 
wages are explained by differences in education (Borjas 1995, Grogger and Trejo 2002), 
educational decomposition for overall distributions of immigrant, 1.5 generation, and US-born 
wages falls far short of explaining wage differentials, with substantial residual differences 
remaining.  At least in part, this is due to the overall shape of the wage distribution, in that there   34
is persistent concentration of immigrants and their children at the lower end of the distribution.  
Distributional analysis thus provides evidence of what these researchers call the “very different 
labor market opportunities” available to immigrants and natives (Grogger and Trejo 2002).  
More interestingly, the sizable residual wage differentials that persist after controlling for group 
differences in educational composition vary geographically.  While educational differences 
explain almost two-thirds of the wage distribution difference between native whites and second 
generation Hispanics in Los Angeles, they explain just over half of the difference between the 
two groups in New York City. 
As Waldinger reminds us, New York may no longer be “the promised city” for immigrants 
and their children.  In some ways, however, this has little to do with the labor market 
disadvantage of first generation immigrants, or even their children, despite the continued 
emphasis on the vastly polarized 3
rd-world in the 1
st-world immigrant cities discourse.  New 
York and Los Angeles’ lack of promise for immigrants may have as much to do with the racially 
stratified local labor markets for those whose parents and even grandparents were born in the 
US.  Segmented assimilation theorists were right in suggesting that there are many Americas one 
could assimilate into, but that none of them exactly hold equal promise for everyone.  How the 
children of immigrants fare may have much to do with where they locate, and the relational 
inequalities that structure labor markets – such that (at least in New York) their greater gains vis-
à-vis their parents are curtailed by labor markets that are segregated racially - maintaining 
distinctions from US-born white workers well beyond the second generation.  Oddly enough, 
questioning immigrant assimilation, and especially 1.5 generation assimilation, only lets us see 
how very far we have yet to come.  This is the reason that I suggest that studies of immigrant 
incorporation need to turn away from individualistic accounts of individual skill and toward   35
consideration of structural inequality with its differing rewards of local labor markets to 
individuals with different bodies but similar skills.  The next step, then, is to consider the 
dynamic interplay between internal migration, immigrant selectivity, and the geographies of 
immigrant and second generation incorporation – and the role immigration plays in structuring 
who marks the bottom of the labor market (Goodwin-White 2006b). 
The combination of local labor market analysis of immigrant cities with a relative 
distributions approach employed here is a useful analytical tool for investigating labor market 
structures and inequality, and yielded insight in this case on the relative position in different 
labor markets for immigrants, their children, and the 2
nd+ generation.  Future research needs to 
attempt better understandings of how immigrants relate to the internally unequal wage structures 
of local labor markets, as well as the internal migration of immigrants and their children (and the 
selectivity thereof) that results from and drives these processes.  The two immigrant cities of Los 
Angeles and New York are merely the starting point for this analysis, in which I hope to 
eventually explore the internal migration and residence decision-making processes of immigrants 
faced with an array of very different place-based opportunities and structures of race and 
immigration-based employment, along the lines of the multi-city analyses undertaken in McCall 
(2001) and Waldinger (2001).   They are, however, a useful starting point in that they allow for 
focused investigation of how the racial labor market contexts of inequality in these two 
immigrant cities shape intergenerational economic progress and the spaces of incorporation.   
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Figure 1 – Relative Wages by Race/Nativity in the US, Los Angeles and New York, 2000 
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Figure 2  - Relative Wages in 1990 and 2000 for the US, Los Angeles, and New York 
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Figure 3 – Relative Decadal Wage Change (90-2000) for Nativity-Race Groups 
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 Figure 4 - Relative Wage Differences Adjusted for Education Composition, 2000 
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